Acquisition, decoding and presentation of information from mobile devices is complex and challenging. Device memory is usually integrated into the device, making isolation prior to recovery difficult. In addition, manufacturers have adopted a variety of file systems and formats complicating de-coding and presentation.
Introduction
Mobile phones and related devices are now a critical component of the global ICT infrastructure. Smart phone (mobile phones with superior processing speed and memory) sales increased during 2010 with over 60 million units sold in the second quarter of 2010 (Gartner, 2010) . Smart phones can run a variety of 'desktop' applications and are typically capable of connecting to the World Wide Web and other Internet based services. As the smart phone has effectively become 'the Internet in your pocket', it could also play an important role in future investigations involving Internet related crime.
Evidence from mobile phones has played an increasing role in recent years in the United Kingdom. For example, mobile phone evidence was used in the prosecution of Ian Huntley (Summers, 2003) , and also used to locate and apprehend suspects in the failed London car bomb attacks in 2007 (Fresco, 2010) . Investigators in the later case, who examined recovered mobile phones and SIM cards, found phone numbers belonging to further members of the terror cell, subsequently leading to their arrest. Mobile phones have also been recovered from inmates in prison and forensic evidence recovered from these devices has shown that criminals are committing further crimes even when they have been sentenced to long jail terms (Whitehead, 2009) .
The established approach to digital forensics (developed for personal computers) is generally inappropriate for mobile devices. Typically, the computer is isolated and then the hard disk is removed (ACPO, 2007) . However, the internal memory of a mobile phone device is usually integrated with other components. Memory chips must be de-soldered from the device's printed circuit board (PCB) to achieve isolation, risking permanent damage to private property (Willassen, 2005) . In some cases, an examiner can instead access the memory via firmware or or by interacting with the device's operating system to gain access to the logical objects stored in the device's file system (Jansen and Ayers, 2007) . However, this makes the examiner dependent on the fidelity of the firmware and software on the device. Once an acquisition has been completed successfully, the data acquired must be decoded. However, there is no standard format of accumulating information in a mobile phone or standard file system (Moore, 2006) , and different manufacturers and models of mobile device will amass the same types of information (call records, SMS messages) using different file formats.
Consequently, recovering evidence from mobile devices in accordance with established principles of forensic evidence is complex and challenging (ACPO, 2 2007; Jansen et al., 2008) . Different approaches and toolkits may recover only subsets of data on mobile devices, or recover artifacts inaccurately. Imperfections in the evidence presented to a forensic investigator may not be apparent from a single tool (or even several different tools).
The capabilities of different mobile forensic tools and approaches can be better understood by comparing the results obtained from a carefully prepared test device. A comparison demonstrates the limitations of different approaches; assists a forensic examiner in justifying why different data sets are recovered using different methods; and helps to detect defects in the forensic software. This paper describes an experiment which compared several methods for recovering evidence from a Windows Mobile smart phone (WMS). The contribution of the paper is two-fold; the paper presents a comparison of information recovery techniques for a single device; and a number of aspects of the Windows mobile platform of relevance to forensics practitioners are identified and documented.
The hypothesis that guides the research proposed in this paper is as follows:
H 1 : different information recovery techniques yield diverse and inconsistent results sets for Windows mobile smart phone devices.
Three supplementary research questions are also to be examined:
1. Is it possible to recover deleted data from a binary image of a Windows Mobile device memory? 2. What embedded databases or artifacts can be retrieved from a physical acquisition that cannot be retrieved using a logical acquisition? 3. How efficient are current digital forensics products in locating all the evidence on a Windows Mobile device?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the available technology for mobile phone forensics and for Windows smart phone devices in particular, and reviews previous empirical investigations of mobile forensic applications. Aspects of the Windows Mobile operating system architecture relevant to the experiment are also described. Section 3 introduces the design of the experiment used to investigate the hypothesis given above, and Section 4 reports the results and also some of the qualitative observations made during the experiment. Finally, Section 5 draws broader conclusions from the experiment and proposes future work.
Literature Review
This section will discuss the state of the art regarding Windows mobile smart phones (WMSs).
Acquisition Methods
Various acquisition methods are available for extracting evidence from mobile devices and specifically WMSs. Different methods are generally categorized as being either a physical or logical acquisition.
Physical acquisition tools recover binary representations of the internal memory of mobile devices and dump them to files. It is possible to acquire a memory image from a mobile device by performing a 'forensic de-soldering' of the internal memory chip(s) from the device's printed circuit board (PCB) (Willassen, 2005) . However, this approach is rather invasive and risks damaging the mobile device. A less invasive approach is to interact with the device memory via JTAG ports attached to the PCB, however, these are not available on all models (Breeuwsma et al., 2007) . These two methods can be used to circumvent security codes on mobile phones, allowing an investigator to retrieve evidence from devices which are deemed to be 'locked' (Klaver, 2010) .
Klaver coined the term 'pseudo physical acquisition' (Klaver, 2010) , which describes the type of acquisition performed by a variety of tools. These tools interact with a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), a generic term for software which abstracts hardware specific features from other operating system components. Typically, this requires running additional software on the mobile device, either by diverting the device's boot sequence or using remote control applications such as Microsoft's ActiveSync. Two commercial toolkits are available for performing a pseudo physical acquisition from mobile devices. XRY Physical, developed by MicroSystemation, which loads the acquisition software onto the device directly from a personal computer, and Cellebrite's Universal Forensic Extraction Device (CUFED) Physical Pro, which is a Windows CE based flasher box, that loads an application from the flasher box to the device using ActiveSync. Both toolkits have been assessed under the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Forensics Tool Testing Project. The XRY toolkit was assessed against the test plan for GSM (Global System for Communication) standard devices (Allen, 2008; National Institute for Justice, 2008 ) and the CUFED toolkit was assessed against the non-GSM test plan (Kuhn, 2009; National Institute for Justice, 2009) . Neither tool has been assessed against the smart phone test plan (Kuhn, 2010) . The RAPI tools developed by Hengeveld can also be used to perform a pseudo physical acquisition (Hengeveld) .
Finally, Rehault has demonstrated that it is possible to create a memory image by using a bootloader. This approach has been demonstrated on a Windows-based 'Kaiser 130' mobile device. Rehault was able to transfer a binary image of the device's memory to a personal computer (Rehault, 2010) .
Logical acquisition tools interact with a mobile device's operating system to recover the logical objects stored in a mobile device's file system, rather than the raw image of a memory chip. XRY Logical by MicroSystemation and the Standard version of the Universal Forensic Extraction Device by Cellebrite can be used to perform a logical acquisition. The Mobile Internal Acquisition Tool (MIAT) can also be used to perform a logical acquisition and was developed specifically for WMSs (Dellutri et al., 2008) . The MIAT software is stored on an external flash memory card (e.g. SD card), which is inserted into the target device. After executing the application the resulting acquisition is then stored on the memory card, which is removed from the device for further analysis of the files acquired.
Several tests have demonstrated that 'on-the-phone' tools such as MIAT can miss forensically significant artifacts on mobile phones, including on WMSs (Dellutri et al., 2008; Mokhonoana and Olivier, 2007) . This is due to the operating system 'withholding' these files from such acquisition tools.
Jahankhani (Jahankhani, 2009 ) describes several logical acquisition tools, which can be used to examine a smart phone, but does not perform any testing; these tools include BitPim, Oxygen Phone Manager, Paraban Cell Seizure and MOBILedit. (Williamson et al., 2006) conducted several tests on Nokia mobile phones using TULP 2G, MOBILedit, Paraban Cell Seizure and Oxygen Phone Manager. The main results from these tests show that these tools cannot be used to recover deleted data and that different tools recover different information from the test devices. The information not recovered by some of the tools included call logs and SMS messages. This paper will focus on the use of Cellebrite's Universal Forensic Extraction Device (CUFED) as an acquisition tool. This is because alternative tools such as XRY Physical and the RAPI toolkit have been well documented by Casey et al. (Casey et al., 2010) and Klaver (Klaver, 2010) respectively.
Windows Mobile Analysis
So far, there are only exploratory investigations of forensic approaches for WMSs. The Windows Mobile operating system has a number of similarities with the Windows desktop OS, including file system structure, directory layout and the common presence of many files and applications (Casey et al., 2010) . WMSs use the Transaction Safe-FAT (TFAT) file system to manage persistent memory, which has a similar layout to the FAT file system on which it is based (Casey et al., 2010) . In addition, the directory structure on Windows Mobile devices is similar to that of the Windows desktop operating system, including directories such as 'Document and Settings', 'My Documents' and 'Program Files'.
Short-message service (SMS) messages, personal contact records and phone call records are stored in the embedded databases in the files cemail.vol and pim.vol in the root directory of the WMS file system. Casey et al. has reviewed files of interest to a forensic investigator on a Windows Mobile; and proposed a method for examining the contents of the cemail.vol file using a Windows Mobile emulator, having extracted the file from the device (Casey et al., 2010) .
Klaver has also investigated the cemail.vol and pim.vol files, and has developed several tools to extract information from them. The xpdumpcedb.exe tool (developed for use with Windows XP) can be used to recover information from the cemail.vol file, after it has been extracted from the binary image. A second tool,wmdumpedb.exe, was developed to examine pim.vol, but this tool can only be run on a Windows CE device or emulator. Both of these tools export their results to an XML file. Furthermore, Klaver has also developed a Python script called, cedbexplorer.py, which can be used to recover both active and deleted data from the cemail.vol file on a Windows XP system. This tool has been made available by Klaver for inclusion in this paper as a comparison to alternative tools (Klaver, 2010) .
Rehault has developed Python scripts to reconstruct the TFAT file system, and like Klaver, has also developed a script called MsgCarving.py to recover message directory structure and content, including deleted data, from a cemail.vol file (Rehault, 2010) .
WMSs, like their desktop counterparts, which run Windows, use a registry to house information about the mobile device. Such information can include configuration of the device and user settings, which is stored in files called hives. Rehault used a custom-built tool to extract registry keys and information from hives, which revealed a wealth of information (Rehault, (Casey et al., 2010) . This paper will not deal with the issue of the Windows Mobile registry and its hives as this has been well documented elsewhere.
Whether it is a physical or a logical acquisition method used to examine a mobile phone, the problem identified from the literature is that different acquisition tools and methods recover different subsets of data from memory. This has left forensic investigators needing to use more than one tool to be confident that they are extracting all the evidence from the device they are examining. In addition, it is not clear that the superset of data recovered using all the different toolkits is consistent.
Experiment Design
The Windows Mobile smart phone used for this work was a HTC Touch Pro2 (Figure 1(a) ), which runs version 6.1 Professional of the operating system (referred to hereafter as 'the device'). The model was chosen because of compatibility with the acquisition toolkit used in the experiment. The device features include 288Mb of RAM and a further 512Mb of internal flash memory; is equipped with GSM, Bluetooth and wireless connectivity; and a camera. Figure 2 illustrates the overall process of the experiment. In summary, the device was pre-loaded with a test data set designed to explore the research questions listed above. A logical and physical acquisition of the device memory was undertaken using Cellebrite's Universal Forensics Extraction Device The results of the physical acquisition were decoded using a selection of different tools and the results were compared to those of the logical acquisition and a manual inspection of the device's contents using the device user interface.
Preparation
A pre-examination of the device was undertaken to determine the data types supported, so that a suitable data set of these files and artifacts could be constructed. For example, textual documents are handled by the Windows Mobile version of Microsoft Word 2007, which supports Word 2007 XML Document (.docx extension), Rich Text Format (.rtf) and Text (.txt) file formats. Consequently, textual documents in the experimental data set were only created in these formats.
The device was also examined to determine which pre-installed applications on the device could generate artifacts of potential forensic value through their use. Two web browsers were selected for the experiment: Internet Explorer and Opera.
The Touch Pro2 was not supplied with an external memory card. Examination of external media has been investigated previously (Jansen and Ayers, 2007) , so no external memory was added to the device.
An experimental data set was constructed, consisting of 82 files and artifacts, to include most of the types of data usually found on a WMS.
A number of methods were used to load the data set onto the device, in a manner that would mimic the normal usage of the device:
• creating data via the user interface, e.g. using Microsoft Word to create a document, using the on-device camera to take a picture and browsing the Internet to create web history;
• receiving data using the Bluetooth and wireless connection, e.g. from another mobile device;
• communication via GSM e.g. sent and received SMS messages and making a phone call; and
• deletion of data just prior to the beginning of the forensic acquisition stage.
The device was connected to an unsecured wireless network to access the Web and a Blackberry 8520 was used as the 'other' device for the Bluetooth connection. A T-Mobile (UK) pay-as-you go SIM card was used for performing GSM communication.
The data set is split into three subsets:
• smart phone data, i.e. data generally found on a smart phone and not a conventional mobile phone. Examples of this include Office files, Website favourites and multimedia files (Table 1) ;
• telephony artifacts found on conventional mobile phones, for example SMS messages, call logs and personal contact information (Table 2) ; and
• a combination of artifacts and files which were added to the device using the same methods described in Tables 1 and 2 were deleted prior to performing the first acquisition (Table 3) .
Message-Digest 5 (MD5), context triggered piecewise hash (fuzzy hashes) and file header information of each file was also recorded (where appropriate), for use during the analysis section of the experiment. 
Forensic Acquisition
A physical acquisition of the device was performed immediately after the test data set was loaded. The device was connected to the source port of the CUFED using the appropriate cable and a 2GB USB flash drive (forensically wiped using Department of Defense Computer Forensics Lab dd tool (dcfldd) version 1.3.4) was connected to the target port. Following instructions from the CUFED, ActiveSync was enabled on the device (this is necessary for a software client, WMDmp111.exe, to be transferred to the device). The device make and model were selected and confirmed. The USB flash drive was selected as the target media. The acquisition then proceeded, taking approximately 1 hour to complete. Four image files were created on the USB flash drive, as well as a text file containing a log of the acquisition and a .ufd file, which is used by the software accompanying CUFED (Physical Analyzer) to recover the device file system and artifacts from the image (hereafter the 'Physical Analyzer result set').
The logical acquisition was performed immediately after the physical acquisition and followed a similar process to the one described above, except that the transferred software client interacted with the device file system, rather than lower level software. The logical extraction took 6 minutes and 17 seconds to complete. The CUFED confirmed that the acquisition was successful, and displayed the device's International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. After completing the acquisition, the contents of the USB Flash drive were examined (hereafter the 'logical result set'). CUFED created a summary report in HTML format, as well as a report of the Phonebook entries and three directories called ('Audio', 'Video' and 'Images').
Finally, a manual examination of the device was conducted via the device user interface. A log of all actions taken during the examination was Call To maintained and a digital camera was used to provide supplementary documentation of the state of the user interface after each step. The log and camera were also used to record the information observed on the device during the examination. Table 4 lists the software tools used to examine the binary image produced using the CUFED, categorised as either file system based forensic toolkits or file carvers. The forensic toolkits use file system information to locate and recover logical files. File carving tools can be used to recover files and data from hard disk drives; and in particular drives which have been formatted, or files that have been deleted. File carvers bypass the file system and instead use file signatures or file headers and trailers to locate and carve files from a binary image (Roussev, 2005) .
Decoding Methods
Further manipulation of the logical result set (also produced using the CUFED) is not necessary, since the logical artifacts are provided by the device operating system. Similarly, the manual acquisition result set cannot be processed further, since it is based on observations of the device user interface. Each method produced a result set of recovered files. Each file or artifact in these results sets was then compared with the original file or artifact in the test set and categorized as follows:
Full recovery (F) : Full recovery of the file with an MD5 hash matching that of the original file.
Partial (P) : Contents of the file were recovered, and file appears to be the same as the original (via a visual inspection), but the MD5 hashes do not match. In the case of audio and video files, the recovered file plays a similar length to the original file.
Detected (D) : Contents were recovered for the file, but were noticeably different from the original file. Audio and video files, did not play in VLC media player. Images were classified as 'detected' if a recognisable but smaller version of the image was recovered. A file was also classified as detected if its fuzzy hash score was 0.
Not Applicable (N) : The file was not supported by the method used, or was not detected during the process of using that specific method.
Contents of files categorised as 'partial' or 'detected' were compared using a context triggered piecewise hash (fuzzy hash), implemented in the open source program SSdeep. Fuzzy hashes can be used to measure the similarity of two files, by breaking the file in question into smaller blocks and then calculating the hash of each block (Kornblum, 2006) . SSdeep reports a similarity value between 0-100 for two files, with 100 meaning that they are the same.
File Carving Smart Phone Memory Dumps
Each of the file carving applications were configured to recover file types with signatures in the formats shown in Table 5 (prevailing file extensions are given for brevity of identification of the format). Header and trailer signatures can be specified for Scalpel and Foremost, as well as a maximum size of file to carve when a trailer is not found, or is not part of the file format. An online database of file signatures was used to extend the default file formats supported by each of the carvers where possible (Kessler, 2010) .
Simple File Carver cannot be configured with a file signature specific maximum file size. Instead, a single global maximum file size value is defined for all file signatures, and this results in every file type being recovered as the same size. Files smaller than the limit will potentially contain 'junk' from other files, whilst files larger than the maximum size may not be completely recovered. For this work, the maximum file size was set to 15Mb.
Phone Image Carver is specifically designed for mobile phone image carving. The tool supports over 300 file types, but does not allow further file types to be added to its database, which meant a number of file types from the data set would not be detected. 
Recovering Artifacts from Files
None of the file carving tools used can directly extract artifacts from within files. Such information includes the contents of the two volumes cemail.vol and pim.vol, or data such as websites visited using the web browsers on a WMS. Instead, the file carving tools were configured to search for files containing these types of content and two string extractor tools (BinText and Strings) were used to recover the information artifacts.
Embedded Databases
We are unaware of a published source of information relating to the file headers for these files, so they were obtained during the analysis of the file system using Physical Analyzer. However, when the extraction was repeated to verify the information recovered, it was discovered that these header sequences had changed, so cannot be used to repeatedly recover embedded databases from Windows Mobile devices. The information was used to configure the two Linux based file carving tools and Simple File Carver, and both files were recovered. The two recovered files were then processed using the two string extractor tools.
Using the method discussed by Klaver (Klaver, 2010) , an alternative method of recovering data from cemail.vol was also examined. A Windows XP system running Python version 3.1.3 was used to execute the script cedbexplorer.py from the command line. This script took as input the cemail.vol file, extracted from the binary image using Physical Analyzer, and produced output as a log file.
Internet Explorer History
The contents of the file:
were examined using the hex viewer in Physical Analyzer, which revealed a common pattern for identifying websites visited using the Internet Explorer web browser. The word 'Visited' appears before the website address of the website history record, as can be seen in Figure 3 . The history file for Opera, the second web browser on the device, has no file header nor do any of the addresses have a common starting reference, which makes file carving the Opera history file more difficult. 00 00 00 00 10 00 02 00 ZXoTL5yM........ 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 94 00 10 1F ................ 41 00 66 00 72 00 69 00 63 00 61 00 20 00 4E 00 A.f.r.i.c.a. .N. 65 00 77 00 73 00 20 00 2D 00 20 00 48 00 65 00 e.w.s. .-. .H.e. 61 00 64 00 6C 00 69 00 6E 00 65 00 73 00 2C 00 a.d.l.i.n.e.s.,. 20 00 53 00 74 00 6F 00 72 00 69 00 65 00 73 00 .S.t.o.r.i.e.s. 20 00 61 00 6E 00 64 00 20 00 56 00 69 00 64 00 .a.n.d. .V.i.d. 65 00 6F 00 20 00 66 00 72 00 6F 00 6D 00 20 00 e.o. .f.r.o.m. . 43 00 4E 00 4E 00 2E 00 63 00 6F 00 6D 00 20 00 C.N.N...c.o.m. . 49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 61 00 74 00 I.n.t.e.r.n.a.t. 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 i o n a l....... 
Internet Favourites
The two web browsers share a common 'Favourites' favourite websites repository. This information is stored in the directory \Windows\Favourites. The file contents of the directory were also inspected with the hex viewer in Physical Analyzer. Every file in this folder has a header beginning with the string "[InternetShortcut]", which was used in a similar way as for locating and recovering the web history files from the binary image.
Email Messages
Email messages were also searched for using the file carvers. Emails are stored in a plain text encoding, and were found to use one of these headers: MIME Delivered-To
Return-Path
The content was carved from the binary image and was viewable in either a text editor or could be decoded using Forensic Toolkit (FTK), Encase, or an email application.
Results

Manual Examination
The manual examination partially recovered all of the files from the test set still present in the file system. Full recovery (according to the defini- tion given above) is not possible via manual examination, because the MD5 hash of the recovered file cannot be established from the user interface on the device. Artifacts such as Internet Explorer history, favourite websites and emails can be accessed using the appropriate application on the device. Unsurprisingly, manual examination did not recover deleted files and data types. fields were recovered, including the date, time and status (see Figure 5) . The 'Number' field for SMS messages received by the device was recovered. The Cellebrite documentation also states that emails are decoded and recovered by Physical Analyzer for the device model (Cellebrite, 2010b) . However, although the date, time, status, sender, status and priority fields are recovered, the actual contents of the email body are omitted (Figure 6 ).
No deleted file contents were recovered, although the file names of deleted files were listed in the report, or presented in the file system view. Flash memory space must be erased before it can be re-used (Casey et al., 2010) , and the results suggest that this occurs immediately after deletion in the TFAT file system. corrupted file system was tested by replacing the file system type in the boot sector of the binary image with the value x00 using a hex editor ( Figure  7 ). When the altered binary image was loaded into Physical Analyzer, the software was unable to reconstruct the file system or decode and recover any of the contained files.
Forensic Toolkits
The FTK and Encase toolkits were unable to recover the file system from the binary image file. The FTK toolkit reported a boot sector error and did not proceed further. No error messages were reported by Encase. The file system was successfully recovered by the WinHex toolkit after altering the file system label from TFAT32 to FAT32 (see Figure 8 ) and files were recovered as reported in Table 6 .
File Carvers
Recovering files from the binary image file presented several problems from a forensic perspective. Principally, the files recovered were not labelled with the original file names as in the test set (because information in the actual file system is not be used). In addition, very few of the files recovered using this method had matching hashes with their respective originals. Table 7 presents the results of fuzzy hash computations for selected files loaded onto the mobile device. The table also includes the fuzzy hash results for files recovered using WinHex and Physical Analyzer for comparison. These two toolkits utilised the file system information available in the image, so were able to completely and accurately recover the selected files. Results for individual file carvers are discussed below. A custom configuration was enabled by adding extra file type signatures for .mp3, and .mp4 files. This resulted in the .mp4 file being 'detected' but unplayable with a SSdeep score of 80, whilst the .mp3 file was partially recovered with a SSdeep score of 55. The .wmv file was also partially recovered, but with a reduced SSdeep score (65 instead of 99). The .avi file was 'detected' (SSdeep score of 0), and this too was unplayable. In addition, the Office documents recovered using the default configuration were not recovered using the custom configuration. It appears these Office documents are recovered using 'built in functions' which seem to be disabled when a custom configuration is used. Table 8 summarises the results of applying different recovery techniques to information stored in cemail.vol and pim.vol (volumes). Scalpel, Foremost and Simple File Carver were used to recover text-based artifacts. The contents of the recovered files were then processed using the string extractor tools (Strings and Bintext). The results were compared to the contents of the equivalent files in the Physical Analyzer result set. 
Recovering Artifacts from File Carver Output
The analysis revealed that the contents of the file carver recovered volumes differed from those recovered by Physical Analyzer assisted by file system information, as discussed earlier. The three file carvers (Scalpel, Foremost and Simple File Carver) appear to 'skip' several sectors of the two volumes and then resume carving. The reason for this phenomenon is unknown but as a result, these two carved volume files contain less information than the two volume files recovered using Physical Analyzer. Repeating the process using WinHex instead of Scalpel and Foremost recovered the same information as for Physical Analyzer (since WinHex also uses information about the file system to assist in recovery).
SMS messages (Figure 9 ), contacts, (Figure 10 ) calendar artifacts, Internet Explorer web history, favourite websites and emails were also successfully recovered using the file carving and string extracting method. This analysis confirms recent work by Casey et al., who also investigated the potential to recover deleted information from the cemail.vol and pim.vol files (Casey et al., 2010) .
Recovering Artifacts from cedbexplorer.py
The python script, cedbexplorer.py was used to recover SMS messages from the files extracted by Physical Analyzer. After using the script, an examination of the files recovered showed that items 33-38 (SMS messages sent and received using the device) and 75-77 (messages deleted prior to the acquisition) were fully recovered in a log file output of the script. Due to the nature and purpose of this tool, it was not possible to recover any further files from the data sets in Tables 1, 2 
Conclusions
This work has demonstrated that a diverse range of files and information artifacts are recovered from a Windows Mobile smart phone device, depending on the methods and tools employed. For example, the logical acquisition of contacts using the CUFED does not retrieve deleted contacts. However, these can be recovered using string extractor tools on the pim.vol file recovered from the binary image using Physical Analyzer. In addition, different recovery tools produce result sets of varying fidelity to the original test set.
The work has demonstrated that it is possible to recover files and artifacts from memory images of Windows Mobile devices using a combination of file carvers and string extraction software. The method can be used to both extend and complement the information recovered using industry standard forensic toolkits. Additional information is recovered, including Internet Explorer history, favourite websites and Email messages, as well as the contents of artifacts such as calendar appointments and contacts. It was also shown that it is possible to recover deleted versions of some of these artifact types.
The limitations of using file carvers for information recovery were also empirically demonstrated. The lack of file system information means that file carvers are dependent on the presence of file content signatures (at both the header and footer) and the contiguity of the file contents in the image. These requirements were not satisfied by the binary image recovered from the test device, causing files and artifacts to only be partially recovered.
The use of diverse methods of information recovery also presents challenges, since the multiple and quite diverse results set produced give rise to questions as to the fidelity of each of the tools used. The work demonstrates that while a diverse approach to information recovery leads to a more complete results set, cross comparisons of artifacts in multiple results (e.g. for merging an evidence base) presents challenges. Apparently similar artifacts in different results set have been demonstrated to be quite different when analysed using a fuzzy hashing technique. A practising forensics examiner, or a court might quite reasonably ask "which result set is correct?".
The work identified several differences between the documented capabilities of the CUFED and its actual performance. The logical acquisition process was unable to recover the number fields of SMS messages, while for the physical acquisition, the contents of emails were not recovered. The challenge of maintaining accurate documentation and defect free, reliable software is well established in the software engineering community for multiple application domains (Robinson, 1996; Lock et al., 2008; Hunt and Thomas, 2002; Emam and Koru, 2008) , however, it is often difficult to independently establish the reliability of proprietary forensic software.
Finally, the work has demonstrated the fragility of existing mobile forensic toolkits when recovering data from partially corrupted file system images. Physical Analyzer was unable to process and decode a corrupted file system, which meant that the file contents and artifacts were not recovered from the binary image. Two of the forensic toolkits (FTK and Encase) were unable to process the binary image at all, even when alterations were made to the file system boot sector. WinHex was able to process the binary image only when the file system type label was altered.
A practical consequence of the conclusions drawn above is the importance of digital forensic investigators utilising a diverse range of tools for the analysis of information held on mobile devices. Results from different tools must be compared for differences, and the causes of those differences investigated so that they can be explained as part of the evidence presentation process. Further work is also needed on tools for assisting forensics investigators with performing comparisons of results from different toolsets and methods.
The work presented in this paper is based on an analysis of a single Windows Mobile device running the Windows Mobile 6 operating system. Further investigation is required to establish the validity of the results across a range of Windows Mobile devices. Since this work was conducted and submitted for review, version 7 of the Windows Mobile operating system has been released. New research is now required to investigate the effectiveness of mobile forensics tools on this new platform. The design of the test set presented here provides a basis for future comparisons and evaluation.
Further work is also required in the area of file carvers designed for forensic work on mobile phones, and for the Windows Mobile platform specifically. The development of a dedicated carver to support recovery of artifacts from mobile devices without relying on information contained in the device file system. This would also provide a means of verifying the results recovered from mobile devices using standard forensics toolkits assisted by file system information. In addition, methods of establishing the integrity (e.g. computing hashes direct from the source image in a forensically sound manner) of on device information artifacts is necessary to support testing of mobile forensic acquisition toolkits.
